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The ability for emergency first responders to access sensitive information for 
which they have not been pre-vetted can save lives and property. We describe a 
trusted emergency management solution for ensuring that sensitive information is 
protected from unauthorized access, while allowing for extraordinary access to 
be authorized under the duress of an emergency.  Our solution comprises an 
emergency access control policy, an operational model and a scalable system 
security architecture. The operational model involves end-users who are on call 
as first responders, providers of critical information, and a coordinating authority. 
Extraordinary access to information is allowed to occur only during emergencies, 
and only in a confined emergency partition, which is unavailable before the 
emergency and can be completely purged after the emergency. As all information 
remains within its assigned partition, after the emergency the system can 
meaningfully enforce its pre-emergency access control policy.  A major 
component of the architecture is the end-user device, and we describe 
mechanisms on the device for secure storage of data, and for management of 
emergency state, to indicate feasibility. 
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Abstract. The ability for emergency first responders to access sensitive information for which they 
have not been pre-vetted can save lives and property. We describe a trusted emergency management 
solution for ensuring that sensitive information is protected from unauthorized access, while allowing 
for extraordinary access to be authorized under the duress of an emergency.  Our solution comprises 
an emergency access control policy, an operational model and a scalable system security architecture. 
The operational model involves end-users who are on call as first responders, providers of critical 
information, and a coordinating authority. Extraordinary access to information is allowed to occur 
only during emergencies, and only in a confined emergency partition, which is unavailable before the 
emergency and can be completely purged after the emergency. As all information remains within its 
assigned partition, after the emergency the system can meaningfully enforce its pre-emergency access 
control policy.  A major component of the architecture is the end-user device, and we describe 
mechanisms on the device for secure storage of data, and for management of emergency state, to 
indicate feasibility. 
1 Introduction 
During crises, first-responders can often save lives and preserve property better if they have 
access to certain sensitive or restricted information – such as the addresses of the elderly or 
handicapped, or the blueprints for transportation control systems and private buildings.  However, 
the large population of potential first responders makes it infeasible to pre-screen them all, e.g. via 
national security clearances. On the other hand, if sensitive information is not protected 
adequately, the resulting damage could be comparable in scope to the lives and property otherwise 
saved. Currently, even temporary access to such sensitive information may not be available to first 
responders, because of privacy, liability, and other concerns, although the need for dynamic 
security policies and systems, which can adapt to changing circumstances, is recognized [21]. 
To support effective emergency response, participating organizations must have confidence that 
the information they make available is protected from unauthorized access and propogation.  In 
this paper, we provide a new policy and operational model for the management of emergency 
information.  We describe a technical foundation for the automated realization of the emergency 
information model in a modern IT environment.  At the heart of this solution is a security 
architecture that utilizes the latest state-of-the-art hardware security concepts as well as the newest 
generation of secure separation kernel technology.  Together, these results provide an 
environment for emergency information management and protection that is:  
• Demonstrably assurable to enforce its security policies, 
• Persistent during “emergency” as well as non-emergency periods, and 
• Global across all participating organizations 
Our approach provides verifiable techniques for both enabling temporary access to sensitive 
information needed during catastrophes and emergencies, and strictly prohibiting the propagation 
of that information – and ultimately rescinding it after the emergency. We also describe innovative 
techniques for effective management of emergency state in a distributed environment and for 
efficient use of new processor-internal encryption mechanisms for the protection of stored data.  
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To be practical, i.e., easy to use, commercially feasible, as well as effective, a solution to this 
problem must be usable “in the field” and provide dual-use functions on familiar equipment.  This 
ensures that first responders are adept in the use of the device and that it is likely to be at hand if 
and when an emergency arises. The target platform for research and validation of our approach is 
a handheld computer, the E-device.  Our security solutions in this form factor provide a mobile 
emergency-response capability that enables rapid, knowledgeable, emergency response, promotes 
usability, and ensures Third Party information protection during emergencies.  The result is a 
trusted foundation for more effective crisis management activities.  
The remainder of the document is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the conceptual model 
including the primary entities involved, the elements of trust between them, and the system 
security policy that governs access to information.  Section 3 describes the security architecture to 
support this policy and model.  Sections 4 and 5 describe engineering details of our innovative 
secure data storage and emergency state management mechanisms.  Related work and conclusions 
follow in Sections 6 and 7. 
2 Model for Emergency Information Management  
In the emergency-response milieu we consider the following roles, each of which has a direct 
stake in effectiveness of the E-device:  
• First responders – members of our primary health and safety organizations (e.g., medical, 
police and fire), as well as transportation, communication, construction, maintenance and 
other workers who may be called on at the scene of a disaster. 
• The Authority – an organization that coordinates emergency response in a given context, 
such as the Department of Homeland Security, or other disaster-relief coordinating 
organization. Within a large enterprise, the Authority could be a dedicated department. 
• Third Party data providers that supply emergency information. As a simplifying assumption 
for our initial work, we consider Third Parties to be mutually trusting – forming a single 
class of trust – and are represented simply as a single Third Party.  
We refer to information that is designated to be available to emergency first responders, which 
they may not have been vetted or cleared to see, as “emergency information.” Emergency 
information is “owned” by third parties, who may not wish it to be generally distributed or shared 
with other third parties. In many cases, there are financial, regulatory and political hurdles to 
sharing information, as well.  
Some examples of emergency information that can enable effective emergency response relate to: 
• Physical security– building plans, transportation logistics, critical control mechanisms 
• Privacy of customers and employees – medical, communication, and employment records 
• Nationally classified information – “continuity of government plans” and information about 
chemical/biological warfare supplies and antidotes.  
• Trade secrets – the inner workings of pharmaceutical and electronic products  
First responders are provided with E-devices, which provide both day-to-day and emergency-
response information and communications needs. The E-Device is initialized with certain 
emergency information, and the Authority can transmit additional emergency information to the 
E-device in the field.  The collection of E-devices, along with the trusted systems with which the 
Authority and the Third Party communicate with E-devices, along with the communication 
infrastructure, comprise the distributed emergency information management system, or 




For simplicity in the initial model, we characterize the emergency state of the Emergency Network 
as either “on” or “off.”  The Authority manages the emergency state, and communicates state 
changes to E-devices and Third Parties. 
Next, we look at the policy and trust model for emergency information management, followed by 
the business and operational arrangements that support a secure configuration. 
3 Transient Trust Security Policy 
The objective is to enable first responders to access emergency information in a secure manner.  
We assume the existence of a strict policy regarding the authorized accesses of users to data 
objects. We define an emergency policy that allows additional, “extraordinary accesses” by end 
users to emergency information, which may occur only during an emergency.1 While these 
accesses are not violations of the security policy, they are “beyond the pale” of usual MAC and 
DAC controls [15], and are thus additional constraints are appropriate. Together the strict policy 
and the emergency policy can be thought of as the emergency network’s overall security policy.   
The temporal constraint on extraordinary accesses reduces the window of opportunity resulting 
from adverse security events that are outside of the control of the trusted computing base, such as 
can result from the inadvertent disclosure of a password, or the behavior of a malicious insider.   
Consistency of local and global emergency state is important, although the natural variability of 
mobile device connectivity limits the degree of consistency achievable.  The emergency network 
stakeholders must agree on a revocation policy for when an E-device loses connectivity with the 
Authority during an emergency For example, it may be allowable for the user to continue to have 
access to the device’s local emergency information, as limited by a timeout value that provides an 
upper bound on delayed revocation [9][19], until connectivity is reestablished and the E-device 
can re-synchronize with the global emergency state.  
3.1 Trust Model 
The Emergency Network trust model – the explicit behavioral dependencies between 
stakeholders, and supporting cryptographic key exchanges – is subject to many variables.  We 
present the following arrangement sand procedures as a framework for discussion and analysis 
of our approach, but many other arrangements are possible within its solution space.  
The Authority establishes an agreement (e.g., MOU or SLA) with the Third Parties regarding their 
various expected behaviors, such as the precise information sharing policies and level of 
protection that will be afforded to shared information. The E-device developer must design and 
implement it to meet all of the security requirements and policies agreed to by the stakeholders. 
Depending on the assurance requirements specified in those agreements, the E-device may be 
subject to an independent evaluation, such as defined by the Common Criteria [3], to validate its 
security properties. 
The Authority and the Third Party may agree for the E-device to host one or more Third Party 
“trusted” applications in the Trusted Partition (discussed below), which provides a protected 
processing environment for these applications. The specific security and functional characteristics 
of the trusted applications that the Third Party depends on are outside of the scope of this paper, 
although in any event, enforcement of transient trust security policy would not depend on Third 
Party applications. 
                                                 
1 Transient trust is the concept of securely bestowing temporary, additional privileges to users so that they can more 




The Third Parties also rely on the Authority to declare the start and end of the emergency in an 
appropriate and secure manner; to correctly configure the E-devices at a device-configuration 
Depot; and to subsequently protect any secret cryptographic keys entrusted to it.  
The Authority and individual Third Parties exchange symmetric-cryptography keying material of 
the quality agreed upon. Additionally, our approach supports the following operations and 
features: 
• The Authority initializes the E-devices, including installation of cryptographic keys, Third 
Party applications and pre-distributed Third Party emergency data. 
• The Authority shares a separate secret key with each device, which is installed into the 
hardware at the Depot. Third Parties may not access this key.   
• The Authority shares a separate secret with each Third Party, which may not be shared with 
any of the E-devices.   
• Third Parties may have a secret key installed on certain E-devices to support secure 
communication with those devices. 
The Authority is a proxy for the Third Parties in terms of enforcement the security policy.  No 
attempt is made to protect Third Party communications, data or code from access or modification 
by the Authority, given that the Authority installs all cryptographic keys and trusted software. 
 
4 Security Architecture for Emergency Information Management 
The technological foundation of our solution is the SecureCore security architecture [11][6][13] 
shown in Figure 1. We also postulate the availability of certain currently proposed hardware 
security primitives, as discussed below.  
The nexus of security enforcement on the E-device, the Trusted Management Layer (TML), 










interact with one partition at a time. The TML creates and manages the Emergency Partition as a 
protected staging area where emergency information is confined, and where users are provided 
with transient access to the information. The Emergency partition may be configured to permit 
access to non-emergency data as well.  Emergency data is only stored in the Emergency Partition, 
and the TML ensures that information does not leave the Emergency Partition (except for writing 
to the Third Party via a trusted network channel). The TML ensures that only authorized users 
may access the Emergency (or any other) Partition. The net result is that the only way a user can 
ever access emergency information is through an Emergency Partition during an emergency. 
The TML comprises the Least Privilege Separation Kernel [16][12] and the Trusted Services 
Layer (TSL) layer [6]. The LPSK creates exported resources from the platform’s physical 
resources, partitions the exported resources and controls interactions between the partitions. The 
TSL layer virtualizes certain LPSK resources for the use of partition applications (e.g., 
commercial OSs), and associates security labels with the kernel’s exported resources. 
The Trusted Partition contains the Trusted Executive (TE), which provides process services for 
high integrity applications, such as secure sealing of documents and secure session management, 
as well as the Trusted Path Application (TPA), which is the gatekeeper for user access to 
partitions, as directed by the TML.   
The Normal Partitions, i.e., those other than Trusted and Emergency Partitions, and Emergency 
Partitions are intended to host a commercial OS and typical office applications, providing familiar 
and functionally rich user interfaces.   
The strict security policy is enforced on the E-device through the TML’s lattice-based security 
policy, which provides the desired qualities of global and persistent policy enforcement, including 
the usual MLS restrictions on access to data. For support of transient trust, the emergency policy 
allows extraordinary accesses, within predefined and well-understood limits with respect to the 
lattice.  The details for the use of MLS labels in this manner are currently being investigated. 
On the E-device, the TML communicates with the Authority to manage local awareness of 
emergency state. Once a particular emergency ends, the TML renders the Emergency Partition 
inaccessible to the E-device user.  The TML can be configured so that after the emergency a 
snapshot of emergency data is either copied to a static emergency storage partition (e.g., for audit 
of generated or modified data), or updated data is transmitted to the Third Party. A daemon 
process in the Emergency Partition manages the reception of emergency data in the field, e.g., for 
data updates as well as to “rotate” information to the device when the device’s storage capacity is 
insufficient  – otherwise the Emergency Partition is quiescent during the emergency-off state. 
4.1 Hardware Cryptographic Primitives 
We assume the availability of several hardware cryptographic primitives like those postulated for 
the Secret Protected (SP) processor [14] [7]. While we characterize these features as part of the 
hardware instruction set, some may be suitably instantiated through an off-chip device [20]. 
The processor differentiates a crypto processing (or “concealed execution”) mode, wherein access 
to the cryptographic primitives is provided to software.  This mode is entered and exited through 
the execution of special instructions.  
The set of contiguous instructions to be executed while in crypto processing mode is called a 
Trusted Software Module (TSM). Before installation, a TSM is hashed with a processor-resident, 
device-specific “root” key (DRK).  When a TSM is loaded into memory for execution, the 
instructions are validated relative to the previously generated hash values  – providing integrity of 




Several non-volatile processor registers are available only when in the crypto processing mode: 
one (DRK) that can be written only once per boot; and two general storage registers (called SRH 
and CEM_buffer). 
Three crypto-transform functions are provided: sp_derive, which hashes two words with the DRK; 
secure_store, which marks a cache line for processing (i.e., hashing and encryption with the DRK) 
upon eviction from the processor cache (thus, the transform occurs asynchronously to the 
execution of the secure_store instruction); and secure_load, which decrypts memory as it is loaded 
into the processor cache and validates its hash.  
4.2 Crypto-Hardware Protection of TML  
We introduce another processor mode, called code integrity check (CIC) mode, for protection of 
the privileged “supervisor” program.  At compile time, the TML code is hashed with the DRK.  
When such code is executed, the inline hash values are validated, and execution is halted if the 
validation fails. This ensures that the TML code can only be executed on the intended device, and 
any changes to TML code are detected.  While the crypto-processing mode is single-threaded, CIC 
mode supports multithreading. 
4.3 Subjects and Objects 
There are zero or more processes per partition. A multi-program process can be structured to 
utilize the several rings (i.e., hardware privilege levels) available outside of the TML, e.g., one 
program per ring. Thus, a “subject” is a process-ring pair, and the use of multiple programs within 
a process can provide efficient and secure interaction between subjects. 
The TML exports several object abstractions: memory segments, and synchronization primitives; 
and two object group structures: disk volumes, and segment volumes.  
4.4 Disk Volumes 
A disk volume is a contiguous set of physical disk sectors that is exported to a particular partition 
by the TML as a (virtual) disk device.  The guest OS of one partition can mount the disk volume 
of another partition, as allowed by the TML security policy, which enables sharing of persistent 
data between the partitions.  However, if the guest OS creates its own object abstractions within a 
volume, the TML cannot help enforce OS restrictions (e.g., for applying the principle of least 
privilege) regarding the separation of those “objects.” 
Table 1. Authentication and communication security 
Party 1 Party 2 Key Basis 
Authority E-device  
Trusted Component 
Device Root Key 
(DRK) 
Authority Third Party Keys agreed to in 
SLA/MOU 
Third Party E-device 
Normal Partition 
Keys provided by 
Third Party  






4.5 Segments and Segment Volumes 
Segments are individual memory objects exported and protected by LPSK (as opposed to OS-
created objects inside of a disk volume). User-accessible segments are organized in exported 
segment volumes managed by the LPSK. Similarly, the TML maintains one or more internal 
segment volumes for its own use. 
The segment volume structures (i.e., all of the segments and related metadata that comprise a 
segment volume) are sealed and encrypted on disk.   A general description of how the TML 
secures segment volumes is provided in Section 5. 
4.6 Trusted Channels and Trusted Paths 
Trusted channels are cryptographically secured communication paths between two trusted 
components (e.g., the TML and the trusted computer of the Authority or Third Party). The TML 
can also export a given trusted channel to a specific partition’s application domain, via a logical 
I/O device, which provides connectivity between the applications in that partition and the trusted 
component at the other end of the trusted channel.  
A trusted path is a secured communication path between a user and a trusted component. If the 
Authority utilizes trusted software to access a trusted channel between his computer and the TML, 
a remote trusted path to the TML results.  
Trusted channel keys and related sensitive channel parameters are stored in a TML database and 
are not available to applications; other parameters are made available to applications as necessary 
(e.g., the device handle).  The TML encrypts the database with a key derived from the DRK.  The 
TML can recreate this key using its TSM functions, so the key does not need to be stored in 
persistent memory. The E-device can be configured so that security levels are bound to certain 
remote IP addresses. When network data is sent or received by a partition, the E-device must 
ensure that the remote-address level matches the partition level and matches or is within the level 
range of the physical device. 
Table 1 shows the cryptographic keys used as the basis for creating Trusted channels. For 
example, a trusted component of the E-device may establish a trusted channel with the Authority. 
The channel security is based on a session key generated with the sp_derive instruction from a non- 
generated key will be secret. 
5 Secure Storage Solution 
5.1 Sealing procedures 
Segment volumes can be sealed to protect their integrity at various intervals or in response to 
different events such as a request to shut down the system.  For this description, we assumed that 
there is one exported and one internal volume (called evol and ivol), but extension to support 
multiple segment volumes should be straightforward.  
secret seed that is shared with the Authority; since the DRK utilized by sp_derive is secret, the  
The TML calls an internal TSM with volume check-sum values it has calculated, which moves 
each check-sum to a register and then calls sp_derive to generate and store the seal (shown as V- 
hash in Figure 2) to the SRH register. 
5.2 Storage procedures  
 Efficient encrypted disk storage functions can be created from transient memory encryption 




move it onto the disk2 (see details in Section 5.3. Alternatively, if it is desired to use programmed 
I/O to write to disk, data marked with secure_store can be loaded in a normal manner (i.e., by not 
using secure_load) which will cause it to arrive in the processor register encrypted. 
When the data is reloaded it will be decrypted with the DRK.  We assume that the integrity 
validation data from the encryption phase can be accessed to validate the loaded, decrypted data, 
or that the integrity check can otherwise be bypassed or ignored (since we separately 
cryptographically sign the volumes, the hardware integrity check is not needed). 
Encryption of user data (exported volumes) can be handled in different ways. For example, the 
tml_disk_flush function defined below can be exported to segment-aware applications, or the TML 
could coerce any calls to write to the disk to use this logic. 
Another possibility is to configure sp_secure_store to use a value in one of the generally-
accessible crypto registers, in which case, the user’s stored, encrypted data could be portable to 
another of his or her E-devices (or to another computer that is enabled with similar hardware 
cryptographic functions) in which  the user has installed the encryption key. 
5.3 Hardware Encryption Details 
To encrypt a segment on disk, applications (or modules within TML) call tml_secure_flush with the 
handle of the segment. tml_disk_flush first ensures that all of the “cache lines” of the segment are 
marked for encryption by calling _tml_mark_secure, and then calls lpsk_flush2disk to write the 
encrypted segment to disk. 
                                                 
2 This assumes that the encryption function is not vulnerable to known plaintext attacks, which would expose the DRK. 
 
 





 for i = 1 .. Length(user_seg) do   
 if not user_seg.i.SecureData then   
 _tml_mark_secure(user_seg.i, user_seg, i) 
 lpsk_flush2disk(user_seg) 
_tml_mark_secure is handed a word of data and a memory destination (segment and offset).  It 
moves the word into a general-purpose register and then calls _TSM_secure_store. 
_tml_mark_secure(w: word, dest_seg: ivol_seg, offset: word) =  
 hw_move(R2, w) 
 _TSM_secure_store(dest_seg, offset, R2))  
The internal procedure _TSM_secure_store calls sp_secure_store to mark the cache line for 
encryption: 
_TSM_secure_store(dest_seg, offset, R2)=( 
 sp_secure_store(dest_seg, offset, R2)) 
lpsk_flush2disk pushes to main memory the elements of the segment that are in the processor cache, 
which causes SP to encrypt them, and then writes the entire segment to the disk.  If the operation 
is called from within an TSM, a DMA disk device must be used to copy the encrypted segment 
directly from memory onto the disk, because using the processor to write to disk would cause the 
memory to be decrypted first - i.e., by pulling it back into the processor in order to write to the 
disk.  If not in a TSM, then programmed I/O or DMA I/O can be used to write to the disk. 
lpsk_flush2disk(user_seg) =  
 for i = 1 .. Length(user_seg) do  //flush seg cache lines  
  x86_clflush(i)  
     _dma_device_write(user_seg) 
6 Emergency State Management Solution 
Emergency state management is a security critical operation as the access to emergency 
information is dependent on the state of emergency as seen by the E-device. Thus, emergency 
state management must be assured to a degree commensurate with the required level of trust of the 
Emergency Network.  
Recall that the Authority maintains the global emergency state of the network and communicates 
state changes to E-devices. Trusted components of the E-device (such as the Emergency Manager, 
“e-manager,” and TPA in Figure 3) receive, store, and respond to emergency status updates. 
Although these functions can be implemented in software, hardware can provide additional 
assurance (i.e., assuming a validated implementation, the non-malleability of hardware logic 





The processor is extended with several state-management features: Two new instructions: 
hw_update_state and hw_get_state; a local state counter: e_counter; and a state bit: e_state. 
6.1 Emergency State Transition Protocol 
The Authority keeps a record of the E-device_id and DRK for each E-device. It also maintains the 
emergency state-change number. 
To announce a change to the emergency state, the Authority updates its own information (in this 
case, the start of an emergency):  
emergency_counter = emergency_counter + 1  
emergency_state = 1  // emergency is “on” 
… and then generates an emergency message for one or more E-devices, and sends them each 
over a trusted channel (see Section 6.4). The message contains two parts, a payload and the hash 
of the payload.  
The payload contains the new emergency state and the global state-change number; it is encrypted 
with each E-device’s DRK (in this case, reflecting device number n): 
payload = _authority_encrypt(e-state, e-counter, DRKn)  
The crypto-hash  of the encrypted payload is also based on the target E-device’s DRK:   
hash = _authority_keyed_hash(payload, DRKn) 
The message is the concatenation of the payload and the hash: 
message = _authority_concatenate(payload, hash) 
 
 




As shown in Figure 3 a TSL trusted channel manager on the E-device receives the message, and 
sends it to the e-manager. The e-manager calls its TSM to update the emergency state. 
If hw_update_state was successful, the e-manager sends an acknowledgement to the Authority and 
calls its TSM to get the value of  e-state. 
The e-manager takes appropriate action depending on whether an emergency has started or 
stopped.  In the former case, it will signal to the TPA to announce an emergency to the user and 
make the Emergency Partition available; or it will terminate an existing emergency. 
6.2 State Management Hardware Support Details 
Hardware processes hw_update_state with the following actions (see Table 2), which from the 
interface to the hardware appear to be atomic (internal logical functions that are not available at 
the hardware interface are prefaced with a tilde “~”).  Before processing, hardware ensures that the 
calling program has sufficient privilege.  
hw_update_state(message) = 
 tmp := ~sp_check_hash (DRK, message.payload, message.hash)  
 if tmp = “success” then 
  tmp := ~sp_decrypt(DRK, message.payload, tmp_values)  
  if tmp = “success” then  
   if tmp_values.counter > e_counter then  
    e_counter := tmp_values.counter 
    e-state := tmp_values.state 
   else tmp = “bad_ecounter” 
 return (tmp)  // “success” or a specific error 
hw_update_state validates the hash against the payload using the E-device’s DRK, and then 
decrypts the payload with the DRK.  It also checks that the new counter value is greater than the 
previous value to ensure that hardware has not been requested to perform duplicate updates. If 
successful, hardware then writes the decrypted payload state to the hardware e-state register. 
Table 2. State Management Instructions 
Instruction Arguments Exceptions 
hw_update_state subject: implicit  
message: string 
1. Subject lacks sufficient privilege  
2. Message has wrong format 
3. The message counter value is too low  
4. The message hash does not match 
hw_get_state subject: implicit  
GR1: word 
 
The calling subject is an implicit parameter, which indicates the security attributes of the 
program or module that invokes the hardware instruction. 
6.3 Emergency State Protocol Security Analysis 
The correct management of emergencies depends on the correct interpretation of the global 
emergency state by E-devices.  Threats to this correctness include corrupted, impersonated or 
disrupted communication of the emergency message, and corrupted, impersonated or disrupted 
processing or storage of the emergency state on the local E-device. Additionally, in situations 




communication, storage, and processing is a concern.  These concerns are addressed in the 
sections below. 
6.3.1 Communications integrity 
It does not appear that the uniqueness of the emergency message can be ensured in a simple one-
way communication from the Authority to the hardware, as it would be difficult for the E-device 
to distinguish previous authentic messages that it had missed from authentic current messages.  
In contrast, the use of the trusted channel ensures that the emergency message is from a trusted 
source and is current. The emergency hash and counter provide additional defense-in-depth that 
the message is authentic, current, and unmodified during communication. 
6.3.2 Communications availability 
Availability is problematic, as we cannot guarantee connectivity of the E-devices.  However, we 
expect the E-devices to use best effort techniques to stay synchronized with the Authority.  
An E-device may be offline occasionally, for example during extreme emergency conditions, but 
the proposed emergency policy allows the user to continue to have access to emergency data if the 
E-device loses connectivity during the emergency-on state. During the offline period, it is 
conceivable the emergency could even have cycled on and off one or more times.  
The individual E-device does not need to be concerned with offline state changes; only that it 
should re-synchronize its emergency state (i.e., request an emergency state packet from the 
Authority) when connectivity is restored, and do so before any further user activity is allowed. 
6.3.3 Storage and processing integrity 
On the E-device, emergency state is managed exclusively by trusted components.  State changes 
are validated and stored in hardware. Access to these state elements is restricted to TSMs.  
Hardware support enhances protection against attacks on the storage and processing of emergency 
state and reduces the amount of software that must be trusted for emergency state management. 
One potential threat is that corrupted trusted software (while the  security architecture provides 
high assurance self-protection, this analysis is provided to support defense-in-depth) on the E-
device could seal messages with the DRK by using sp_derive, and then spoof the E-device into 
believing the wrong emergency status.  However, protection against these counterfeit emergency 
messages is accomplished by the use of a different emergency-signing algorithm than that used by 
sp_derive (e.g., the seals could be a different length).  
6.3.4 Emergency confidentiality 
Confidentiality is ensured through several means: the use of a trusted channel for communications, 
the use of trusted components for management of emergency state, and  hardware support for 
hiding the content of emergency messages during processing and storage. (This even hides the 
value of upcoming state changes from the trusted components until after the hardware state change 
has occurred). 
7 Related Work 
Our work utilizes currently-proposed concepts for CPU-based cryptographic support. Although 
mechanisms for cryptographic support using coprocessors are available, e.g. the IBM 4758 co-
processor [18] and the TCG Trusted Platform Module [20], these schemes do not provide the 
CPU-level of protection for system software and data. Thus they are more vulnerable to internal 




In 2006, IBM announced “Secure Blue”, an architecture that features encryption built into the 
microprocessor intended to protect the integrity the system as well as protect data on chip and in 
transit to remote systems [10]. To date, little additional information is available, however, the 
announcement did not discuss the trustworthiness of the architecture, nor did it address the 
problem of separating information associated with events or based upon mandatory policies. 
Fu and Xu describe an access control model for mobile computing environments that includes 
spatial and temporal factors, however this work does not address the concerns of mandatory policy 
enforcement or the practical implementation of such a system [8]. A model for temporal access 
control in the context of databases has been proposed [2] and an authorization model for access to 
data during restricted time intervals was presented by Afinidad [1]. Neither addresses the problem 
of event-based access that would be required in an emergency.  Similarly, implementations of 
temporal access controls, e.g. [5], are for predefined time intervals rather than aperiodic events. 
Ross Anderson proposed a model [Error! Reference source not found.] for the security and 
privacy of patients’ medical information, which accommodates “emergency” access to 
information, e.g., for extraordinary medical or legal events. In this model, restrictions on access to 
patient records are controlled via access control lists.  No changes to the lists are made without 
previous user consent.  A record is kept of all accesses to records and changes to access control 
lists, and the user is notified of any emergency over-ride of the rule of consent or of the access list 
mechanism.  Our approach differs from this model in several ways, most notably in the abilities to 
control when emergency overrides may occur, to control the extent of emergency override, and the 
capability to revoke permissions to information in real time. 
Yang and Shin [22] describe techniques to use a page-based access control mechanism within a 
hypervisor.  This approach differs from ours in that it does not address emergency access; it relies 
on an untrusted hypervisor; and it potentially requires almost twice the amount of system memory. 
The OASIS EDXL provides a standard for the format of information exchange during 
emergencies [17]. The specification states that the confidentiality level of each payload should be 
provided within each content object. In addition, payloads may be encrypted and multiple 
encrypted payloads may appear in the same message.  The architecture presented here would 
provide a trusted context for the management of EDXL data. 
8 Conclusions  
In this paper, we addressed the primary information assurance problem faced in emergency 
management: the secure dissemination and control of sensitive organizational information during a 
crisis.  Information sharing during an emergency is distinguished by the need to allow 
extraordinary access to information for relatively short periods, and the need for information 
sharing by separate organizations with varying security requirements and varying amounts of 
mutual trust.   
Our approach provides a business and operational trust model that addresses the inherent policy 
concerns of a multi-organizational emergency network. We also presented the concept of transient 
trust, and described how it is secured through both spatial and temporal confinement of emergency 
information.   
An integrated technical solution for management of emergency information is encompassed in our 
security architecture, which is based on the Least Privileged Separation Kernel, and utilizes next 
generation hardware-based cryptographic primitives.  We also describe two point solutions for 
emergency management, both of which leverage new hardware security primitives within the 
context of our security architecture: using transient-memory encryption for secure data storage, 
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